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I. INTRODUCTION
In December of 1979, I was living in a Virginia suburb of
Washington, D.C., and serving as a law clerk to Judge Roger
Robb of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit. For Christmas, my wife gave to me the
popular book for lawyers that year-The Brethren: Inside The
Supreme Court by Bob Woodward and Scott Armstrong.' I was
hoping to remain in Washington for another year, having
applied to become one of Chief Justice Warren E. Burger's law
clerks for October Term 1980. I was elated when I received the
telephone call on New Year's Day of 1980 informing me that I
had been selected as a law clerk to the Chief Justice. However,
during the following weeks when I began reading the unflatter-
ing and unfair portrayal of Warren Burger in The Brethren, I
became somewhat concerned about my future employment. I
spoke with Judge Robb about the man I would come to know
simply as "the Chief," and Judge Robb assured me that I would
find him to be warm, generous, and engaging. Indeed, he was.
My year with the Chief taught me much about law and life. He
t Partner, Faegre & Benson, Minneapolis, Minnesota. A.B. 1976, Harvard
University; J.D. 1979, The National Law Center--George Washington University.
1. BOB WOODWARD & SCOFT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME
COURT (1979).
1
Volling: Warren E. Burger: An Independent Pragmatist Remembered
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1996
WLL!AM M/TCHELL LAW REVIEW
was mentor and friend to his law clerks, and his passing has left
a great void for me personally and for the entire "law clerk
family."
The impression Chief Justice Burger made on America's
legal institutions and jurisprudence will be indelible. His career,
spanning more than sixty years, was nothing short of remarkable.
While many have described his skills as a lawyer, his love of
history, his incomparable administrative talents, and his tireless
dedication to the work of his high office, I believe that his
greatness also can be found in his character and philosophy as
a jurist. Above all, Chief Justice Burger understood the impor-
tance of tempering abstract legal tenets with practicality. He
approached his awesome responsibilities as the nation's fifteenth
Chief Justice with an independent mind and a deep reverence
for the law and the proper role of the courts. In the words of
one of his former colleagues on the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, ChiefJustice Burger
"was not an ideologue, and his opinions reflect the experience
and common sense that he brought to bear on national prob-
lems."
2
Warren Earl Burger was born on September 17, 1907, in
Saint Paul, Minnesota. He was one of seven children of Charles
and Katharine Burger. The family, living on a twenty-one-acre
truck farm outside of Saint Paul, was of modest means. Charles
Burger supplemented his income by selling weighing scales, and
the children were expected to do their share as well. It was
during these early years that Warren Burger first developed his
lifelong appetite for hard work. He earned extra money while
attending public high school by selling articles on school sports
and other news to the Saint Paul newspapers. He also found
time to excel at his studies and at a variety of extracurricular
activities.
Warren Burger financed his formal education after high
school by taking ajob as an insurance salesman for the Mutual
Life Insurance Company of New York. The future ChiefJustice
completed his academic requirements at night by attending the
University of Minnesota's evening division for two years and then
enrolling in night classes at the Saint Paul College of Law (now
2. George E. MacKinnon, in A Tribute to ChiefJustice Warren E. Burger, 100 HARV.
L. R1Ev. 969, 993 (1987).
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William Mitchell College of Law), from which he graduated with
high honors and to which he returned as an adjunct faculty
member for twelve years.
Admitted to the Minnesota bar in 1931, Warren Burger
immediatelyjoined one of the fine law firms in Saint Paul, where
he became a partner after only two years. He continued in
general law practice until 1953, when he was appointed by
President Eisenhower as an assistant attorney general of the
United States to head the Claims Division, one of the largest
divisions in the Department of Justice. In that capacity, he
distinguished himself in a group of outstanding lawyers, includ-
ing Attorney General Herbert Brownell, future Secretary of State
William Rogers, and other nationally prominent assistant
attorneys general. Departing from the usual practice of division
heads, Warren Burger argued many important cases in trial and
appellate courts, and in 1955, he was selected by the Attorney
General to argue Peters v. Hobfy s in the United States Supreme
Court. He also received acclaim for his success in litigation
against Aristotle Onassis and other shipping magnates, which was
achieved through the innovative creation of jurisdiction for the
United States courts over Greek-owned ships in international
waters and which netted the United States government the then-
considerable sum of ten million dollars.
After three years at the Department of Justice, Warren
Burger tendered his resignation, intending to return to Saint
Paul to resume the private practice of law. Those plans were
forestalled in 1956 when President Eisenhower persuaded him
to remain in Washington and appointed him to the influential
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit. At this time, the federal courts of the District of
Columbia were vested with the broadestjurisdiction of any court
in the land, functioning as the equivalent of state courts for the
District itself, as well as having the regular jurisdiction of other
federal courts. In addition, cases from all federal agencies could
also be appealed to the District of Columbia Circuit. This
situation created a unique mix of cases ranging from common
felony crimes to highly technical issues of federal law, a micro-
cosm of all facets of American jurisprudence within one circuit.
Judge Burger quickly found himself embroiled in the
3. 349 U.S. 331 (1955).
1996]
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important controversies regarding the criminal law that were
sweeping the nation at the time. His opinions, whether in the
majority or in dissent, held to the view that solicitude for the
rights of the accused must be balanced with the need to enforce
the law. Yet, Judge Burger was reluctant to press for the
wholesale overruling of prior decisions, preferring instead to
curtail their reach while preserving theirjurisprudential essence.
This approach was evident in the per curiam opinion that
Judge Burger authored in McDonald v. United States,4 which
revisited the rule promulgated some years earlier by Judge
Bazelon in Durham v. United States.5 The Durham court, respond-
ing to advances in the field of psychiatry, had rejected the long-
standing rule in M'Naghten's Cas# and held that a jury could
find a defendant not guilty by reason of insanity if his acts were
the product of a "mental disease or defect,"7 a result that many
commentators believed was fraught with possibilities for abuse.
McDonald left the basic rule of Durham intact, while drastically
restricting its scope by defining "mental disease or defect"
narrowly.
8
Judge Burger's opinions in McDonald and in other cases
"established him as a leader on his court and throughout the
nation in the fight for judicial decisions that were not based on
technicalities."9 This reputation was further cemented by a
speech he gave at Ripon College in 1967, which received
national media attention. Comparing the American criminal
justice system with that of the Scandinavian countries, Judge
Burger found it wanting. His recommendations for reform
delivered in the Ripon College speech were frequently quoted by
the 1968 Republican Party candidates.
When in 1969 President Nixon was faced with the vacancy
on the Supreme Court occasioned by the retirement of Chief
Justice Earl Warren, he turned to Warren Earl Burger. Follow-
ing the unanimous endorsement of the Judiciary Committee, he
was speedily confirmed by the Senate, and sworn in as the
fifteenth Chief Justice of the United States on June 23, 1969.
4. 312 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
5. 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
6. 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).
7. Durham, 214 F.2d at 874-75.
8. McDona/4 312 F.2d at 851.
9. MacKinnon, supra note 2, at 991.
[Vol. 22
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Thus, at age sixty-two, when many lawyers contemplate retire-
ment, Warren Burger embarked on a new career in America's
highest judicial office with all of its manifold duties. His broad
background of forging his own way from an early age through
prodigious effort and ingenuity, of twenty-five years of private
and public law practice focused on a vast array of problems, and
of thirteen years on the federal appellate bench on a court of
extensive jurisdiction and great impact, clearly shaped his
approach to the difficult legal issues he encountered as Chief
Justice. His judicial philosophy was borne, not out of some
agenda or ideology, but out of careful analysis of each case and
each issue on the merits with due regard for the appropriate and
limited role of the third branch of the United States govern-
ment. Thatjudicial philosophy is best characterized by the traits
of independence and pragmatism that were so much a part of
Warren Burger's personality. What follows are some examples
of a jurisprudence of independent pragmatism brought to bear
by Chief Justice Burger on critical subject areas during and after
his tenure on the Court.
II. CRIMINAL JUSTICE
Considering his "law-and-order" reputation, there were many
pundits who expected that, as Chief Justice, Warren Burger
would strive to overturn the landmark criminal law decisions of
the Warren Court. But neither those who hoped for this
outcome, nor those who feared it, took adequate account of the
new Chief Justice's respect for precedent and the doctrine of
stare decisis. Chief Justice Burger simply cared too deeply for the
great institution that is the Supreme Court of the United States
to allow its decisions articulating our nation's highest law to be
tossed aside based upon a shift of political winds or a change in
judicial personnel.
On the Supreme Court, his approach to major criminal law
precedents such as Miranda v. Arizona" and Mapp v. Ohio"
resembled the way he handled cases like McDonald on the Circuit
Court of Appeals. He preferred to leave the rulings intact, while
defining their outer limits. For example, Chief Justice Burger
held that a statement otherwise inadmissible under the Miranda
10. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
11. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
1996]
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rule could be used to impeach a defendant's credibility at
trial, 12 and he joined in opinions establishing a "public safety"
exception to Miranda"3 and concluding that a confession
obtained in violation of Miranda did not taint a second, valid
confession. 4 Similarly, the Court led by Chief Justice Burger
trimmed the exclusionary rule of Mapp by carving out "good
faith exceptions" 5 and expanding the "reasonableness" doc-
trinel' introduced by the Warren Court in Terry v. Ohio.17
While seeking balance in the criminal law, Chief Justice
Burger never abandoned the fundamental principle that our law
must protect the individual from the excessive exercise of
government power. As one of my law clerk colleagues has
observed:
He respected the prerogatives of the other branches of
government; he disapproved of reversing criminal convictions
for artificial or insubstantial reasons; he did not believe in
hindering police in performing legitimate law enforcement
functions. At the same time, he proclaimed clearly and
repeatedly that he would never vote to overrule Miranda,
because to do so would be an invitation to lawlessness by law
enforcement authorities.'8
Indeed, in Estelle v. Smith,' 9 Chief Justice Burger wrote the
majority opinion establishing the right of a convicted murderer
to exclude at the sentencing phase of his capital trial testimony
based on psychiatric interviews conducted without Miranda
warnings and without the assistance of counsel. Although
possible to rely on Sixth Amendment grounds alone, the Chief
Justice did not shrink from employing the Fifth Amendment and
12. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
13. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
14. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
15. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984); Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468
U.S. 981 (1984).
16. See, e.g., NewJersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (holding that a public school
official may search a student's locker if a reasonable basis exists for believing the search
will produce evidence of a rule violation); Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983)
(holding that a police search of an arrestee's personal effects is a reasonable part of
routine procedure); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976) (holding that a
routine police search and inventory of an impounded car is reasonable).
17. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
18. Alex Kozinski, in A Tribute to ChiefJutire Warren E. Burger, 100 HARV. L. REV.
969, 977-78 (1987).
19. 451 U.S. 454 (1981).
[Vol. 22
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the Miranda rule to fully address the governmental conduct at
issue in Estelle v. Smith and to declare that conduct unconstitu-
tional. Likewise, he demonstrated his commitment to stability in
the law as a jurisprudential value by his reaffirmation of Massiah
v. United States" through his majority opinion in United States v.
Henry,21 and by his observance of Fourth Amendment dictates
in his opinion for the Court in United States v. Chadwick.22 He
also concurred in decisions extending to misdemeanor cases the
right of indigent defendants to counsel 23 announced in Gideon
v. Wainwright,24 and expanding Griffin v. Illinois5 to ensure a
defendant's right to a psychiatrist if necessary for his defense. 6
As one commentator has aptly noted, "the anticipated
Burger Court counterrevolution in criminal procedure never
materialized."27 That is true in large measure because of Chief
Justice Burger's practical judicial philosophy of not dismantling
settled precedents but, rather, of refining them to achieve
equilibrium without sacrificing fundamental fairness or yielding
excessive authority to government.
III. DISCRIMINATION
Warren Burger was devoted to public affairs from the outset
of his legal career. Apart from his service as president of the
Saint Paul Junior Chamber of Commerce and as trustee of the
world-famous Mayo Foundation, of Macalester College, and of
the Saint Paul College of Law, his concern about the evil of
racial discrimination led him to help organize and become the
first president of the Saint Paul Council on Human Relations.
Because he believed that all aspects of the American legal
process should reflect the law's core values, one of his initiatives
was the Council's sponsorship of police training programs to
improve relations with minority groups.
20. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
21. 447 U.S. 264 (1980).
22. 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
23. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 41 (1972) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
24. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
25. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
26. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 87 (1985) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
27. AlbertW. Alschuler, Failed Pragmatism: Reflections on the Burger Court, 100 HARV.
L. REV. 1436, 1441 (1987). See generally THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-
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Following the bombing of Pearl Harbor in 1941, American
hatred for the Japanese was intense, and there was great public
pressure to relocate forcibly California'sJapanese-Americans. As
a conscientious young lawyer in Minnesota, Warren Burger
believed that the constitutional rights of those individuals should
not be sacrificed to popular passion. He organized and headed
a committee of the Saint Paul Council on Human Relations to
help resettle some of the Japanese-Americans who were being
forced from their homes. He even opened his own home to one
family for nearly a year while the father looked for work. His
actions met with resistance in his community. Nevertheless, he
persevered and did what he could to rectify a grave injustice.
Years later, in 1974, this effort was again brought to mind when
Chief Justice Burger was lecturing in Tokyo, Japan, and he
received an unexpected visit from a Japanese woman whose
family in 1941 had been forced from their home in California
when she was only two years old. She was now living in Tokyo
with her husband, an airline employee, and she was grateful that
her family had been taken in by a thirty-four-year-old, compas-
sionate Minnesota lawyer who had become Chief Justice of the
United States.28
In addition to his work on the Saint Paul Council on
Human Relations, Warren Burger served for many years on the
Minnesota Governor's Interracial Commission. These experienc-
es, together with his openness to other cultures and his recogni-
tion of the dignity and potential of every person regardless of
race, gender, or background, undoubtedly shaped his analysis of
discrimination issues that came before the Supreme Court
during his seventeen-year tenure as Chief Justice.
Compared with the blatant and egregious segregation
confronted by the Warren Court in cases such as Brown v. Board
of Education,29 "[t] he issues faced by the Burger Court in school
desegregation cases were far less simple, with values such as local
control over education, and concerns over the well-being of
school children, often at odds with the goal of racial equality.""°
The post-Brown desegregation cases became increasingly complex
28. Mark W. Cannon, inA Tribute to ChiefJustce WarrenE. Burger, 100 HARV. L. REV.
969, 985-88 (1987).
29. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
30. Bruce E. Rosenblum, WarrenE. Buew and the School Desegregation Cases, 45 OKIA
L. REV. 93, 118 (1992).
[Vol. 22
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as the more insidious aspects of racial discrimination began to
be addressed. District courts were drawn with greater frequency
into complicated questions of quotas, racial balance, redrawing
school district lines, busing, and attendance zones. Many
questioned the propriety of the courts' involvement in these
matters, and there was concern in some quarters that Chief
Justice Burger would be hostile to desegregation efforts. He put
any such concern to rest, however, with his opinion for a
unanimous Court in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of
Education,31 which was "a complete endorsement of a compre-
hensive desegregation order" and "a sweeping confirmation of
the federal courts' powers to enforce Brown's mandate of
desegregation."
2
Although his general opposition to racial discrimination was
deep and traceable back to his early days as a lawyer in Saint
Paul, ChiefJustice Burger did not concede that the power of the
federal courts to end segregation was absolute. Consistent with
his view of the proper role of Article III courts in our constitu-
tional system, the Chief Justice delivered the Court's opinion in
Milliken v. Bradley,"3 which struck down an inter-district remedy
for segregation in the schools of the city of Detroit because that
remedy was not constrained so as to address "the condition that
offends the Constitution." 4 Milliken stood as a limitation on
the federal courts' powers "predicated on principles of federal-
ism and local autonomy." " Indeed, when Chief Justice Burger
did not side with the majority in desegregation cases, "it was
generally on the grounds that the boundaries of judicial
authority had been exceeded." 6 This approach of seeking
jurisprudential equipoise through common-sense weighing of
competing interests in the context of federalism was the
hallmark of Warren Burger's judicial philosophy.
In other civil rights cases, Chief Justice Burger upheld
congressional set-asides of a percentage of public works funds for
minority businesses; 7 invalidated state aid to racially-segregated
31. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
32. Rosenblum, supra note 30, at 101, 118.
33. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
34. Id. at 738.
35. Rosenblum, supra note 30, at 118.
36. Id.
37. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
19961
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private schools;' held that artificial and arbitrary barriers to
employment cannot withstand Title VII scrutiny if such non-job-
related devices discriminate against protected minorities; 9 and
sustained the Internal Revenue Service's denial of tax exemp-
tions to private schools that practiced racial discrimination.'
With respect to the rights of women,41 he authored opinions
striking down a state statute giving preference to men over
women as estate administrators,4 2 and applying Tide VII's
prohibition of sex discrimination to law firm partnership
decisions.4 In addition, he voted to end gender classifications
in Social Security dependent benefits"H and in jury selection.'
These actions, while perhaps surprising to some, were wholly in
accord with Warren Burger's personal values and experience.
IV. SEPARATION OF POWERS AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
The working of American government was a subject of
enormous interest to Chief Justice Burger. He appreciated fully
the concerns of the Framers that led to a constitutional scheme
that separates governmental powers among competing and
mutually-restraining legislative, executive, and judicial branches.
Surely no other modern Chief Justice has been called upon to
wrestle with so many critical issues relating to the separation of
those powers as Warren Burger.
It is incontrovertible that history will likely view ChiefJustice
Burger's opinion for a unanimous Court in United States v.
Nixone as the most significant of his career, perhaps as one of
the most important opinions written by any Justice. The Nixon
decision not only changed the course of contemporary history
and resulted in the resignation of a President, but also reaf-
firmed the core value of a co-equality among the coordinate
branches. Recalling the landmark opinions of ChiefJustice John
38. Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973).
39. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
40. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
41. Women were an important part of Warren Burger's life, including his beloved
wife Vera, daughter Margaret Mary, and daughter-in-law and granddaughters through
his son Wade.
42. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
43. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984).
44. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
45. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
46. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
[Vol. 22
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Marshall which laid the legal foundation for our federal
government, ChiefJustice Burger applied the venerable principle
that no one, regardless how lofty his station, is above the law.
While acknowledging and preserving the doctrine of executive
privilege, the Chief Justice concluded that
To read the Art[icle] II powers of the President as providing
an absolute privilege as against a subpoena essential to
enforcement of criminal statutes on no more than a general-
ized claim of the public interest in confidentiality of nonmili-
tary and nondiplomatic discussions would upset the constitu-
tional balance of "a workable government" and gravely impair
the role of the courts under Art[icle] III."
Because President Nixon's generalized assertion of privilege
could not prevail over the fundamental demands of due process
of law in the fair administration of criminal justice, it had to
"yield to the demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a
pending criminal trial."' a Those who may have expected or
feared blind loyalty to the man who had appointed Warren
Burger to the office of Chief Justice were sorely disappointed;
what they witnessed instead was unswerving adherence to
bedrock elements of American jurisprudence, utilized in a
pragmatic, evenhanded fashion to avert a constitutional crisis.
Chief Justice Burger's fidelity to the separation of powers
mandated in the Constitution was displayed again in his seminal
opinion for the Court in INS v. Chadha, which invalidated the
one-house legislative veto. For over a half-century, Congress's
practice had been to pass legislation imposing duties on the
executive branch, but with the proviso that either house of
Congress could veto a specific action of the executive branch
department involved. By 1983, more than 200 federal statutes
contained such provisions. Striking down the device as unconsti-
tutional, ChiefJustice Burger admonished, "With all the obvious
flaws of delay, untidiness, and potential for abuse, we have not
yet found a better way to preserve freedom than by making the
exercise of power subject to the carefully crafted restraints
spelled out in the Constitution."" While wide in its impact, the
Chief Justice's opinion in Chadha vindicated a concept both
47. Id. at 707.
48. Id. at 713.
49. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
50. Id. at 959.
1996]
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simple and fundamental to the constitutional architecture
wrought by the Framers: for measures to be enacted into law,
they must pass through two branches of government and not
remain within the exclusive province of the Article I branch.
Separation-of-powers concerns also lay at the heart of Chief
Justice Burger's renowned dissent in Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal
Narcotics Agents,51 the case that gave rise to a federal constitu-
tional tort for violations of the Fourth Amendment:
I dissent from today's holding which judicially creates a
damage remedy not provided for by the Constitution and not
enacted by Congress. We would more surely preserve the
important values of the doctrine of separation of pow-
ers-and perhaps get a better result-by recommending a
solution to the Congress as the branch of government in
which the Constitution has vested the legislative power.
Legislation is the business of the Congress, and it has the
facilities and competence for that task-as we do not. 2
The Chief Justice lamented the flaws in the exclusionary rule
and that there was "virtually no evidence that innocent victims
of police error ... have been afforded meaningful redress,"
53
but his common-sense solution was to call upon "Congress [to]
develop an administrative or quasi-judicial remedy against the
government itself to afford compensation and restitution for
persons whose Fourth Amendment rights have been violated."54
Fittingly, Chief Justice Burger spoke to the separation-of-
powers principles he held so dear on the final day he sat as an
active member of the Supreme Court. He delivered the Court's
opinion in Bowsher v. Synar,5 wherein at issue was the Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings Deficit Reduction Act's provision that the
Comptroller General annually collect an estimate of the amount
of the relevant federal budget deficit and report to the Presi-
dent, who was then required to issue a sequestration order
mandating the spending reductions specified by the Comptroller
General. In invalidating this feature of the law, the ChiefJustice
concluded that the duties placed on the Comptroller General
were executive in nature and thus prohibited under the separa-
51. 403 U.S. 388, 411 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 411-12.
53. Id. at 424.
54. Id. at 422.
55. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
[Vol. 22
12
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [1996], Art. 8
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol22/iss1/8
CHJIEFUSTICE WARRENE. BURGER TRIBUTE
tion-of-powers doctrine: "Congress in effect has retained control
over the execution of the Act and has intruded into the execu-
tive function."" Bowsher underscored the foundational premise
in our system of separated powers that the Article I branch may
play no direct role in the execution of the laws, and both Bowsher
and Chadha "can be viewed straightforwardly as efforts by the
Court to keep the legislative branch within the constitutionally-
prescribed ambit of its power."" In Bowsher, "a substantial
national issue was quickly decided in an opinion that directly
attacked the heart of the problem." 8 The exigencies of the
moment, no matter how substantial or pressing, could not justify
for Chief Justice Burger any compromise in the structure of
government so carefully and wisely crafted by the Framers.
While Chief Justice Burger advocated and embodied
common sense and practicality in hisjudicial decisionmaking, he
resisted the temptation to use those virtues in derogation of the
enumerated powers of a co-equal branch of government. In
Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill,5 9 the Court affirmed a court of
appeals' decision directing that a permanent injunction be
issued against completion by the TVA of the Tellico Dam
because that dam would destroy a three-inch-long fish, the snail
darter. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Burger began his
analysis by stating that "[o]ne would be hard pressed to find a
statutory provision whose terms were any plainer" than the
Endangered Species Act's requirement that federal agencies not
take any action to jeopardize the continued existence of an
endangered species.' ° The Chief Justice rejected the dissent's
call to fashion a remedy "'that accords with some modicum of
common sense and the public weal"' as being an invitation to
usurpation of power by the judiciary.61 Recognizing the courts'
limited role in our tripartite system, he emphasized that "[o] nce
the meaning of an enactment is discerned and its constitutional-
ity determined, the judicial process comes to an end."
62
56. 1d. at 734.
57. Charles F. Lettow, Looking at Federal Administrative Law with a Constitutional
Framework in Mind, 45 OKLA. L. REV. 5, 14 (1992).
58. MacKinnon, supra note 2, at 1001.
59. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
60. Id. at 173.
61. Id. at 194 (quoting Powell, J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 194.
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Indeed, the pragmatic and sensible Chief Justice knew that the
courts could not be arbiters of constitutional principles by which
they were unwilling to be governed-the courts could not
exercise the prerogative secured by Marbury v. Madison6 s "to say
what the law is" if they were unwilling to abide by that law.
TVA v. Hill has been described as "[t]he leading plain
meaning case of the Burger Court."8' Chief Justice Burger's
opinion
focused new attention on "plain meaning" as a key preferred
basis for statutory interpretation where it was available. And,
it reintroduced and reinvigorated separation-of-powers
principles not only as providing standards for the Court's
mediation of power and responsibility between the legislative
and executive branches, but also as applying equally to the
judicial branch's concomitant role.'
Throughout his tenure as Chief Justice, from Nixon to
Bowsher, Warren Burger's sound leadership assured the preserva-
tion of the constitutional values essential to the functioning of
our form of government and the safeguarding of our liberty.
V. INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES
Despite his reputation as a "conservative," Chief Justice
Burger was often a vigorous defender of individual liberties
guaranteed by the Constitution. His strong commitment to the
First Amendment values of freedom of speech and of the press
was evident in many of his opinions.
For example, in Wooley v. Maynard,66 the Chief Justice held
that the State of New Hampshire could not compel one of its
residents to carry on his license plate a slogan ("Live Free or
Die") that was offensive to his deeply-held views. Noting that
"the right of freedom of thought protected by the First Amend-
ment..., includes both the right to speak freely and the right to
refrain from speaking at all,"67 Chief Justice Burger opined:
A system which secures the right to proselytize religious,
political and ideological causes must also guarantee the
63. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
64. William N. Eskridge,Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REv. 621, 627 (1990).
65. Lettow, supra note 57, at 31.
66. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
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concomitant right to decline to foster such concepts. ....
[W] e are faced with a state measure which forces an individu-
al, as part of his daily life-indeed constantly while his
automobile is in public view-to be an instrument for
fostering public adherence to an ideological point of view he
finds unacceptable. In doing so, the State "invades the
sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the
First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all
official control." . . . The fact that most individuals agree
with the thought of New Hampshire's motto is not the test.
* . . The First Amendment protects the right of individuals to
hold a point of view different from the majority and to refuse
to foster, in the way New Hampshire commands, an idea they
find morally objectionable.'
Maynard illustrates well Warren Burger's concern for individual
freedom and sensitivity to the power of the state -to encroach
upon that freedom.
Similarly, ChiefJustice Burger attached great importance to
protecting a free and vigorous press, as well as to the responsible
exercise of that great freedom.6 9 Often called upon to recon-
cile conflicting constitutional rights, the ChiefJustice resorted to
fundamental principles. His opinions reflected an abhorrence
of prior restraints.7 ° In Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart,7 1 he ruled
that judges may not prevent newspapers from publishing
information about a crime when less drastic remedies are
available to ensure a fair trial, and the openness of criminal trials
to the public, including the press, was sustained by his opinion
for the Court in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia.72 Writing
for the Court in Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia3 and
in Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co.,74 Chief Justice Burger
sharply circumscribed the power of states to punish the publish-
ers of information deemed to be highly sensitive or confidential.
And the pivotal issue of a state-imposed right of access to the
print media was resolved in favor of the press in the Chief
68. Id. at 714-15 (quoting West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624, 642 (1943)).
69. See Michael J. Wahoske, ChiefJustice Burger and Freedom of the Press, 45 OKLA. L.
REV. 121, 138 (1992).
70. See, e.g., Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 417 (1971).
71. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
72. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
73. 435 U.S. 829 (1978).
74. 443 U.S. 97 (1979).
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Justice's landmark opinion for a unanimous Court in Miami
Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo.75 While the press may have
perceived or imagined Warren Burger to be antagonistic and at
times unfairly characterized him as such, in fact the ChiefJustice
was a great champion of press freedom from governmental
restraint and censorship, but he was also a fervent advocate for
"the concomitant trust placed in the protected press to use that
freedom responsibly and well ... with some reasonable restraint
of its own."76
To Chief Justice Burger, however, the Constitution was not
value-free. He recognized that basic human decency inheres in
ordered liberty, and that our freedoms are not absolute because
there are limits beyond which we may not go without trampling
on the rights of others.7 7 The need to delineate such limits
arose for the Chief Justice with respect to the problem of
obscenity.7" Attempts by the Supreme Court for several years
to establish a workable definition of obscenity for First Amend-
ment purposes had been inconclusive. In Miller v. California,79
ChiefJustice Burger tackled the issue and ended the uncertainty
by crafting the common-sense definition of obscenity that we use
today. Rejecting the "utterly without redeeming social value"
standard set forth in Memoirs v. Massachusetts,"° he made clear
that obscenity was not to be judged by a uniform, national
"community standard":
It is neither realistic nor constitutionally sound to read the
First Amendment as requiring that the people of Maine or
Mississippi accept public depiction of conduct found tolerable
in Las Vegas or New York City... People in different states
vary in their tastes and attitudes, and this diversity is not to be
strangled by the absolutism of imposed uniformity.81
Rather, the Chief Justice held that juries should evaluate the
75. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
76. Wahoske, supra note 69, at 123, 125.
77. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 58 (1973) (writing on behalf
of the Court, ChiefJustice Burger eloquently spoke of "the interest of the public in the
quality of life and the total community environment, the tone of commerce in the great
city centers, and, possibly, the public safety itself").
78. Justice Harlan characterized the pornography issue as "intractable." Interstate
Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 704 (1968) (Harlan,J., concurring and dissenting).
79. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
80. 383 U.S. 413 (1966); see also Miller, 413 U.S. at 24-25 (rejecting Memoirs
analysis).
81. Mi!/er, 413 U.S. at 32-33.
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essentially factual issues of prurient appeal and patent offensive-
ness by the standard that prevails in the local community.
82
This forum-based test served as a reasonable, practical solution
to a long-standing constitutional conundrum.
Issues of "church and state" afforded Chief Justice Burger
the opportunity to pen some of his most significant and
passionate opinions for the Court. The Chief Justice was a
staunch defender of religious liberty. In Wisconsin v. Yoder 8 he
stood up for the rights of the Old Order Amish to carry on their
traditions free from state compulsion with a vigor unsurpassed
in any other Free Exercise Clause case. Likewise, in McDaniel v.
Paty,84 he struck down a state's ban on clergy as delegates to its
constitutional convention, and, in Thomas v. Review Board of the
Indiana Employment Security Division, 8 he upheld the right of a
Jehovah's Witness to refuse to work in a weapons plant.8 6 At
the same time, ChiefJustice Burger was attuned to the strictures
of the Establishment Clause. In Walz v. Tax Commission of New
York,87 he repudiated the "no-aid" dicta of Everson v. Board of
Education' and held that the Establishment Clause did not
prevent a state from granting property tax exemptions to
charitable institutions even if such exemptions provided an
indirect economic benefit to religious organizations. However,
in Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc.,89 the Chief Justice struck down
a state statute giving churches the right to veto liquor licenses,
and in Lemon v. Kurtzman,'° he formulated the three-part test
that has since generally guided Establishment Clause analysis.
With the Religion Clauses, ChiefJustice Burger, as always, sought
reasoned balance and was a painstaking student of history.
Thus, relying on substantial historical evidence dating back to
the Continental Congress, he wrote for the Court in Marsh v.
82. Id. at 30.
83. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
84. 435 U.S. 618 (1978).
85. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
86. Id. Chief Justice Burger was in dissent when the Court struck down an
Alabama law providing for a moment of silence in the public schools. Wallace v.
Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 84 (1985) (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
87. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
88. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
89. 459 U.S. 116 (1982).
90. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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Chambers,9" sustaining the Nebraska Legislature's practice of
opening each legislative day with a prayer led by a chaplain paid
by the State.
While by no means given to the profligate bestowing of
constitutional rights and protections, Warren Burger was a
resolute guardian of individual liberties. His basic concept of
fairness was manifest in his judicial work product, as illustrated
by his opinion for a unanimous Court in Little v. Streater,92
recognizing the right of indigent defendants in paternity suits to
state-subsidized blood tests. The strains of his respect for
individualism, wariness of government power, and informed
sense of history are readily apparent in the decisions that are his
legacy.
VI. ISSUES OF PUBLIC DISCOURSE
Apart from his opinions, insight into Warren Burger as a
jurist can also be gained through certain of his extrajudicial
stances on matters of public import. His position on capital
punishment clearly demonstrates his belief in the self-imposed
cabining ofjudicial power. As a citizen, he was openly critical of
the costs and skeptical of the deterrent effects of the death
penalty; I heard him say often that if he were a legislator, he
would never vote in favor of state-sponsored executions.
However, as Chief Justice, he kept what Justice Jackson referred
to as "the counsels of self-restraint " s and declined to vote his
sympathies on the Court. He was convinced by the text of the
Constitution and the considered actions of Congress and
numerous state legislatures that he could not legitimately
displace what the people through their elected representatives
had seen fit to establish.94
Citizen Burger was also an ardent proponent of gun control.
Although in perfect keeping with his common-sense approach to
national issues, that position may confound those who inaccu-
rately attempt to pigeonhole him as a doctrinaire conservative.
He believed that gun-control opponents had exploited the
91. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
92. 452 U.S. 1 (1981).
93. Robert H. Jackson, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 321 (1941).
94. Kenneth W. Starr, ChiefJustiveBurger's Contribution toAmeianJurisprudence, 1986
SUPREME COURT HISTORICAL SOCIETY YEARBOOK, at 18, 22.
[Vol. 22
18
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [1996], Art. 8
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol22/iss1/8
CHIEFJUSTICE WARRENE. BURGER TRIBUTE
outdated "state militia" concerns underlying the Second
Amendment to the detriment of America. While Chief Justice,
he felt that he could not speak out publicly because Second
Amendment issues could come before the Court and it would be
inappropriate to use his office as a "bully pulpit" in such
circumstances. However, after his active service on the Court, he
courageously called for reasonable restrictions on the ownership
of firearms to end the "mindless homicidal carnage" devastating
the nation he loved.9'
America's penal system was another subject of great interest
to Warren Burger. He spent a lifetime analyzing correctional
issues and comparing correctional facilities and policies through-
out the world. As an admirer of the old-fashioned values of hard
work, opportunity, self-discipline, and education, he actively
urged the creation of realistic means for incarcerated individuals
to learn and to develop useable skills. His dream of "factories
within fences" in order to provide inmates with the tools
necessary to become productive members of society was his
practical solution to the enormous problem of recidivism.
96
This wise effort by the ChiefJustice was borne of his recognition
of the worth of every person and his pragmatic realization of the
societal cost of simply abandoning or warehousing those who
offend our criminal laws.
These extrajudicial positions serve to confirm the character-
istics displayed by Chief Justice Burger on the pages of the
United States Reports. He was a man of broad intellect and
boundless energy who cared deeply about the complex challeng-
es facing America.
VII. PERSONAL REFLECTIONS
In marking his passing, the Harvard Law Review made
reference to the "personal generosity and kindness" of Chief
Justice Burger.97 I can attest to those virtues. My term with
"the Chief" was filled with myriad examples of his courtesy and
graciousness. He was most solicitous of me and my family when
95. Warren E. Burger, The Right to Bear Arms, PARADE MAG.,Jan. 14, 1990, at 4, 6.
It was vintage Warren Burger that he chose the vehicle of Parade Magazine, rather than
some inaccessible scholarly journal, to deliver his message to the people.
96. Kenneth W. Starr, Introduction to Symposium, The Jurisprudence of ChiefJustice
Warren E. Burge, 45 OKL4. L. REv. 1, 3 (1992).
97. In Memoriam: Warren E. Burger, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1, 1 (1995).
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my father-in-law died early in the Term, and he took time from
his busy schedule to visit with my extended family when they
toured the Court and to hold my two-year-old son on his lap.
The Chief provided special opportunities for each of his law
clerks; for me it was accompanying him on a weekend trip to
West Point, where he basked in the chance to interact with
students and faculty in lively discussions on the Constitution and
American government. He was, at heart, a teacher of the
principles that define this nation. Near the close of the Term,
he took my wife and me with him as guests when he delivered
the commencement address at my alma mater, The National Law
Center of George Washington University, and included us at a
small dinner party given in his honor following the ceremonies.
My experience was typical. His relationship with his law clerks
was more than just business-we were "family." We knew that he
cared.
In the work of the Court, the law clerks were close at the
Chief's side. He welcomed our views and reveled in the debate
among us on the difficult cases confronting the Court. I always
found him to be open-minded and willing to have his instincts
challenged. He did not agree in every instance, but he did
listen. He never asked his clerks to toe an ideological line, but
he expected our loyalty. And we understood that the power to
decide was his and his alone. Saturdays were devoted to work in
the chambers, but the Chief would often provide a respite by
preparing lunch for us (usually some kind of soup described by
one of my co-clerks as "always unidentifiable, but always delecta-
ble"),9 accompanied by his fascinating anecdotes and discus-
sion of current events. He respected us as professionals-albeit
neophytes-and he took seriously his role as mentor.
Give-and-take sessions on particular cases were often
conducted one-on-one between the Chief and a law clerk. He
would use this setting to discuss a bench memorandum prepared
by a clerk in anticipation of the oral argument of a case, to work
on revisions to a draft opinion in process, to analyze an opinion
circulated by another Justice, to critique a memorandum
regarding a pending petition for writ of certiorari, or to prepare
for conference. Following the oral argument in one especially
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complicated case, the Chief invited me to have dinner with him
at the Court and review the arguments and issues presented in
anticipation of the Friday conference. We spent a delightful
evening talking about the case, as well as many other topics,
including life in Minnesota and my future plans. Late one day,
when an opinion on which I had worked with the Chief
garnered the votes of more than five Justices, he tracked me
down at the "highest court" above the Supreme Court Library on
which the law clerks play basketball and called me immediately
to convey the good news. I was touched by his thoughtfulness.
The Chief frequently would summon his law clerks together for
an impromptu luncheon or afternoon tea where we would
discuss the results of the Conference or upcoming arguments.
In all of these interactions, the Chief's devotion to the law and
to the Court was obvious.
When dealing with cases, the Chief demanded rigorous
analysis from his law clerks. In opinions, he was insistent that
the question presented for decision be articulated precisely and
that the summary of the facts and procedural history be scrupu-
lously accurate. As a lawyer, he knew only too well the disap-
pointment that comes when an appellate court rules against your
client based upon an erroneous reading of the record. He
admired and required conciseness and clarity; he always sought
to produce opinions that could be read and understood by the
general public. For a young lawyer, the Chief's tutelage was
invaluable.
I took away from my clerkship genuine amazement at the
broad scope of the Chief's responsibilities. In addition to the
heavy workload of the Court, he functioned as the principal
administrative officer of the federal judicial system and devoted
countless hours to improving the administration ofjustice in the
United States. He chaired the Judicial Conference, monitored
legislation affecting thejudiciary, entertained visiting dignitaries,
was a prolific speaker and writer on an array of important
subjects, and was actively involved with the National Judicial
College, the National Center for State Courts, the Institute for
Court Management, and the Federal Judicial Administration
Center. He served on the boards of the National Geographic
Society and the Smithsonian Institution, and his dedication to
the preservation of history led him to found the Supreme Court
Historical Society and to create the position of curator at the
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Supreme Court. His unflagging efforts bore much fruit; in the
words of Chief Justice Vincent L. McKusick of the Maine
Supreme Judicial Court, "Chief Justice Burger has done more
than any other single person in history to improve the operation
of all our nation's courts."9
When Chief Justice Burger retired in 1986 after seventeen
years on the Court, some may have thought it odd that he would
step down from this nation's highest judicial office to chair the
Commission on the Bicentennial of the United States Constitu-
tion. At the time, he remarked that he thought it would be
easier for the President to find a new Chief Justice than to
convince someone else to organize and lead the Bicentennial
celebration. He probably was right, but his unselfishness and
sense of civic duty deserve immense respect. As head of the
Bicentennial Commission, Warren Burger was engaged in a labor
of love in his typical style. He did not succumb to those who
called for erudite conferences and publications as the only fitting
commemoration; he wanted a people's celebration, and he
conducted a "national civics lesson" by handing out innumerable
copies of the Constitution to schoolchildren and making that
great charter of freedom come alive for all Americans. His
spirited service truly enriched our heritage.1"0
VIII. CONCLUSION
Warren Burger was the personification of the Holmesian
paradigm about the life of the law being experience rather than
logic or theory.1 He desired that the law be useful and
relevant to society. He came to each case before the Court
without any rigid ideology or preconceived determination, but
strove to decide correctly each case on its own merits and to
99. Vincent L. McKusick, Address at the Presentation of the Freedom's Foundation
George Washington Award to ChiefJustice Burger (Sept. 15, 1983); see alsoJames F.
Hogg, Chief Justice Warren E. Burger-A Note, 45 OKLA. L. REv. 161, 163-67 (1992)
(describing the Chief Justice's contributions to court administration). In addition to
all of ChiefJustice Burger's official duties, the law clerks observed his zest for life: "We
saw the wine connoisseur, the chef .. , the artist, the sculptor, the naturist ... , the
antique buff, the humorist, and the political observer. We saw much more that, because
of his [olffice, was regrettably hard for others to see. And as we watched, we caught his
contagious enthusiasm for life." J. Michael Luttig, supra p. 32.
100. On the same day we celebrated the 200th anniversary of the Constitution,
Warren Burger celebrated his 80th birthday.
101. Oliver W. Holmes, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1909).
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decide no more than the case required. He had made his own
way from humble beginnings, and thus he valued hard work and
individualism. His independence made him impossible to
predict or categorize; trite labels simply did not fit him, and he
undoubtedly took some delight in from time to time confound-
ing both his detractors and supporters alike. He was a man of
"uncommon, common sense"10 2 who looked for reasonable,
practical solutions to problems, but he did not use pragmatism
as a sword to carve into the province of other government
branches. He had a profound understanding of history,
realizing full well that the unelected federal judiciary as the
intended "least dangerous" branch of government should remain
so. Judge MacKinnon's words of tribute captured his essence:
"He was one of that rare breed of jurists-a lawyer's Justice." l03
The Supreme Court, the judicial branch, and the nation are the
better for Warren Burger's dedicated stewardship. His immea-
surable contribution surely will endure.
102. J. Michael Luttig, supra p. 30.
103. MacKinnon, supra note 2, at 1001.
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